work in education and in the army, and in the new psychology and criminology which claimed to offer a scientific analysis of criminal behavior and intention. The third major work of the revisionist current was my own A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution (1978) . Narrower in scope than the others, it concentrates only on the penitentiary's emergence in England in the period from 1770 to 1840. Despite these differences of scope and intention, all three agreed that the motives and program of reform were more complicated than a simple revulsion at cruelty or impatience with administrative incompetence-the reformer's critique of eighteenth-century punishment flowed from a more not less ambitious conception of power, aiming for the first time at altering the criminal personality. This strategy of power could not be understood unless the history of the prison was incorporated into a history of the philosophy of authority and the exercise of class power in general. The prison was thus studied not for itself but for what its rituals of humiliation could reveal about a society's ruling conceptions of power, social obligation, and human malleability. Within the last two or three years, however, as the wider political climate has changed, these revisionist accounts have come under increasing attack for overschematizing a complex story, and for reducing the intentions behind the new institution to conspiratorial class strategies of divide and rule. The critique has put into question the viability of both Marxist and structural-functionalist social theory and historical explanation, not only in the area of prisons, but by extension in other areas of historical research. These larger implications make the revisionist anti-revisionist debate of interest to readers beyond the historians' parish. What this review of the debate hopes to show is that revisionist arguments, my own included, contained three basic misconceptions: that the state enjoys a monopoly over punitive regulation of behavior in society, that its moral authority and practical power are the binding sources of social order, and that all social relations can be described in the language of subordina-tion. This does not, by implication, make the counter-revisionist position correct. Insofar as it is a position at all, it merely maintains that historical reality is more complex than the revisionists assumed, that reformers were more humanitarian than revisionsits have made them out to be, and that there are no such things as classes. This position abdicates from the task of historical explanation altogether. The real challenge is to find a model of historical explanation which accounts for institutional change without imputing conspiratorial rationality to a ruling class, without reducing institutional development to a formless ad hoc adjustment to contingent crisis, and without assuming a hyper-idealist, all triumphant humanitarian crusade. These are the pitfalls; the problem is to develop a model that avoids these while actually providing explanation. This paper is a step toward such a model, but only a step. Since I am a former, though unrepentant, member of the revisionist school, this exercise is necessarily an exercise in self-criticism. prisoners were often surer of their physical safety under the tighter and more self-confident authoritarian regimes of the forties than they were under the well-meaning but confused reformist regimes of the sixties, might appear to suggest that a return to authoritarianism is the best way to guarantee prisoners' and guards' physical security, if nothing else. Unionized guards and the militant prisoners of today will not permit a return to the prisons of the forties. But if we cannot and ought not repeat history, we can at least learn from history where we went wrong. In the market place of good ideas--decarceration, inmate self- The decline of punishments involving the public infliction of physical pain to the body. Beccaria's campaign against the death penalty in the 1760s, the Pennsylvania statute of 1786, the reformed codes of the "enlightened despots," the French revolutionary decrees against the capital penalty, and Romilly and MacIntosh's capital statutes campaign in England culminated by the 1850s in the restriction of the death penalty to first degree murder and treason. The form of execution was also changed-in France the guillotine was adopted in 1792 as a scientific instrument of death sparing the victim the possible incompetence of the hangman; the traditional Tyburn processional of the condemned through the streets of London was abolished in 1783 in order to curtail the public symbolism of the death spectacle (Foucault 1978 As systems of authority, the new prisons substituted the pains of intention for the pains of neglect (Ignatieff 1978, p. 113) . Reformers like Howard were appalled that the squalor in neglected institutions was justified for its deterrent value. Accordingly, regular diets replaced the fitful provision of food in eighteenthcentury institutions; uniforms replaced rags and personal clothing; prisoners received regular medical attention, and new hygienic rituals (head shaving, entrance examination, and bath) did away with the typhus epidemics which were an intermittent feature of eighteenth-century European prison life.
I6I
State, Civil Society, and Total Institutions These hygienic rituals in turn became a means of stripping inmates of their personal identity. This indicates the ambivalence of "humanitarian" reform: the same measures that protected prisoners' health were explicitly justified as a salutary mortification of the spirit (Ignatieff 1978, p. 100) .
The new prisons substituted the rule of rules for the rule of custom and put an end to the old division of power between the inmate community and the keepers. All accounts of eighteenth-century prisons stress the autonomy and self-government of prisoner communities. Since common law forbade the imposition of coercive routines on prisoners awaiting trial and debtors, they were able to take over the internal government of their wards, allocating cells, establishing their own rules, grievance procedures, and punishments (Innes 1980a (Innes , 1980b Sheehan 1977 II. Jacksonian America: The Emergence of the Asylum Let us turn to this business of explanation and let us begin with the American case, with the work of David Rothman. In Rothman's account, the new total institutions of the Jacksonian period emerged in an overwhelmingly rural and agricultural society, growing beyond the boundaries of the colonial past yet still a generation away from the factory system, industrialism, European immigration, and the big city. It is a fundamental mistake, he argues, to interpret the total institution as an "automatic and inevitable response of an industrial and urban society to crime and poverty" (Rothman 1971, p. xvi). Americans were anxious about the passage of colonial society and the emergence of a restless, socially mobile population moving beyond the controls of family, farm, and town meeting, but there was nothing in this process which itself required the emergence of the new asylums and prisons. The catalyst for institutionalized instruction was not social change itself but the way it was organized into an alarmist interpretation of disorder and dislocation by philanthropic reformers. Crime was read for the first time not as the wickedness of individuals but as an indictment of a disordered society. This explains the emergence of new institutions aiming at the reformation and discipline of the deviant, disorderly, and deranged.
For a society which interpreted crime as the sign of the passing of the colonial order, the penitentiary symbolized an attempt to re-create the godly superintendence and moral discipline of the past within a modern setting. Rothman demonstrates brilliantly that the language developed in a society to explain disorder and deviance also defines the solutions it develops for these problems. An environmentalist theory of crime and faith in the reformative effects of isolation from the environment were linked together in a system of ideas, each legitimizing the other.
Rothman is better at re-creating the reformers' systems of belief than in locating these beliefs in a believable social and economic context. We need to know something about actual trends in crime during 1780-1820 if we are to understand the changing fit between reform and rhetoric and their social context. In the absence of such data, crime becomes a static and empty category in Rothman's analysis, and the reformers' alarmist discourse drifts away from any point of reference.
Why, we need to know, were the Jacksonians so specially anxious about change and disorder, and why did they look back with such nostalgia to colonial society? Rothman simply accepts the Jacksonian reformers' picture of the stable prerevolutionary society they were leaving behind, but surely this was a questionable historical fable. The illegalities of the poor, like the tax exemptions of the rich, were tolerated because of the persistent weakness of an underfinanced, chronically indebted state, the tenacious survival of regional and local immunities, and the persistent countervailing power of the parlements (see Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748), the judiciary, and the nobility. Above all, the margin of illegality enjoyed by the poor reflected a ruling conception of national power as the sovereign's will rather than the operation of a bureaucratic machine. The state, moreover, shared the punitive function with civil society, in the double sense that its public rituals (execution, pillory, whipping, and branding) required completion by the opprobrium of the crowd if they were to have full symbolic effect, and in the sense that household heads, masters, and employers punished directly without invoking the state's power.
Independently of Foucault, Edward Thompson and Douglas
Hay seem to have reached a similar description of the exercise of sovereign power in eighteenth-century England. They put the same emphasis on the symbolic centrality of the public hanging in reproducing awe and deference before the sovereign's mighty but merciful power, and they describe a philosophy of order essentially similar in its permissive approach to the small fish.
Permissive, however, is too nostalgic or sentimental a word for a tactics of order uneasily poised between an obvious and sometimes brutal concern to defend property rights and an equal distaste, moral, libertarian and economic, for the apparatus of state police (Hay 1975 , pp. 17-65; Thompson 1975, conclusion). The Revolution Settlement and the common law tradition imposed limits on the discretionary power of eighteenth-century magistrates, and the common people themselves were quite capable of forcibly reminding magistrates of "the rights of free born Englishmen" and of the protocol of customs guaranteeing free assembly (Thompson 1971) . It is possible that there was no corresponding corpus of rights in common law available to the French poor, but is is hard to believe that they did not hold to some customary beliefs and traditions about the proper bounds of monarchical "police."
Hay's and Thompson's works show up Foucault's tacit assumption that the only limits on public order policy were the mental assumptions of the authorities themselves and the structural weaknesses of the state apparatus. What is missing in his work is the idea that public order strategies were defined within limits marked out not only by the holders of power but also by those they were trying, often vainly, to persuade, subdue, cajole, or repress. Foucault's account consistently portrays authority as having a clear field, able to carry out its strategies without let or hindrance from its own legal principles or from popular opposition. Power is always seen as a strategy, as an instrumentality, never as a social relation between contending social forces. We need to know much more about the social process by which the margin of illegality enjoyed by the poor in the ancien regime was established before we conclude with Foucault that it owed its existence to the toleration of the authorities. My own account also places more stress than Foucault's upon the reformers' concern to defend and explain institutional routines to the confined. As a consequence I have put more emphasis on the humanitarian intentions of the reformers. They were genuinely repelled by the chains, squalor, and neglect they discovered in existing institutions, especially because these compromised the moral legitimacy of the social system in the eyes of the confined. In their theory of the reform of character, the crucial task was to persuade the poor to accept the benevolent intention behind institutional deprivations. Once convinced of the benevolence of the system, reformers argued, prisoners would be unable to take refuge from their own guilt in attacking their confiners. Personal reformation thus meant succumbing to the benevolent logic of their captors. In Foucault's account on the other hand, reformers were not centrally concerned to legitimize new penal measures as humane. 
IV. Class Conflict and the Prison

B. Class Fear
Thus if fears by the ruling orders of a potential union of interest and action between the criminal and working classes are to be regarded as having had some influence in generating public support for mass imprisonment, it must be recognized that these fears were without actual sociological foundation. We are dealing with a form of social fantasy detached from observable reality. Moreover, it is not clear how general these fantasies of revolution were or even how influential they were in galvanizing public opinion in support of the total institution. The difficulty with arguments from class fear is that they are simply too vague, too global, to account for the specific timing of institutional or legislative change. Class fear among educated public opinion in the 1820s and 1830s may have contributed something to the consensus that public order was too parlous and insecure to go on with the haphazard punishment and police strategies of the eighteenth century. But class fear cannot account for the specific idiosyncrasies of the institutional solution-the faith in silence, solitude, religious indoctrination, and hard labor.
If we return to what reformers said they were doing, it becomes clearer to me now than it was when I wrote A Just Measure of Pain that the adoption of the penitentiary in particular and the institutional solution in general cannot be explained in terms of their supposed utility in manufacturing social divisions within the working class. This is because at bottom reformers like most of their own class understood deviance in irreducibly individual rather than collective terms, not ultimately as collective social disobedience, however much distress and collective alienation influenced individuals, but as a highly personal descent into sin and error. Given this individualist reading of deviance, the appeal of institutional solutions lay in the drama of guilt which they forced each offender to play out--the drama of suffering, repentance, reflection, and amendment, watched over by the tutelary eye of the chaplain. Given that all social relations were inscribed within relations of domination and subordination, ordered, so he says, by a continuous disciplinary discourse, it is impossible to identify the privileged sites or actors that controlled all the others. The disciplinary ideology of modern society can be identified as the work of specific social actors but once such an ideology was institutionalized, once its rationality came to be taken for granted, a fully exterior challenge to its logic became impossible. The institutional system took on a life of its own. One cannot say, Foucault argues, that the political apparatus of modern states actually controls the prison system. There is a formal chain of delegation and responsibility from the legislature to the bureaucracy, from the bureaucracy to the warden, and from the warden to guards and prisoners, but this does not take into account the way institutional systems develop their own inertial logic which each "actor" feels powerless to change (even those at its very summit).
Since the appearance of Discipline and Punish, Foucault has reformulated this problem of agency as one of historical causation, putting a new stress on the way in which the new institutions emerged as the unintended consequence of levels of change, which in themselves were independent of each otherthe new discourse on discipline in the Enlightenment, the search by the propertied for stricter legal and social protection, and the crisis in public order. The new discourse emerged prior to the social revolution of the nineteenth century and prior to the labor discipline needs of employers, but once in play ideologically, it provided the program around which constituencies assembled their response to social turbulence and labor indiscipline. Once the disciplinary discourse's independence of its social grounding is granted, it becomes possible to work free of the various traps which the problem of agency has caused for historians-the conspiratorial all-seeing ruling classes of the Marxist account; the low rationality model of ad hoc responses to social crisis, and the hyperidealist version of reform as a humanitarian crusade (see Foucault's interview in Perrot 1980).
B. The Middle Class as a Ruling Class
But where does this leave the concept of a ruling class as the historical actor behind the making of the penitentiary? My own work has been criticized for using middle class as a synonym for ruling class in a period in which it would be more accurate to speak of a bewilderingly complex competition for political power and social influence by different class fractions, professionals, industrialists, and merchants, aristocratic magnates, and small gentry farmers. While it is a convention of Marxist argument that such division of interest and jockeying for power were stilled whenever "the class as a whole" felt threatened from below, my own work on the intense debates about social order policy suggests that choral unanimity was rare even in moments of universally recognized crisis. Unquestionably justices, members of Parliament, and philanthropists recognized each other as the rich and regarded vagrants, pickpockets, and the clamoring political mob as the lower orders, but their sense of "we" versus "they" was not enough to make the ruling class into a collective social actor. One can speak of a ruling class in the sense that access to strategic levers of power was systematically restricted according to wealth and inheritance, but one cannot speak of its acting or thinking as a collective historical subject. One can only ascribe historical effectivity to identifiable social constituencies of individuals who managed to secure political approval for penal change through a process of debate and argument in the society's sites of power. It would be wrong to think of these constituencies of institutional reformers as acting for their class or expressing the logic of its strategic im-peratives. This would make them into ventriloquists for a clairvoyant and unanimous social consensus. In fact they managed to secure only the most grudging and limited kind of approval for their program. The penitentiary continued to be criticized from multiple and contradictory points of view: it was inhumanly severe; it was too lenient; it was too expensive; it could not reconcile deterrence and reform; the reformation of criminals was a sentimental delusion; and so on.
In Important as the penal sanction may have been in sustaining discipline in pauperized labor markets, or in constituting wage discipline itself in the face of worker resistance, we ought not to take these instances as typical of the role of state force once the wage bargain has been broadly accepted. We ought not to assume that exploitative social relations are impossible to reproduce without threat of force. Even in objectively exploitative, underpaid, and unhealthy conditions of labor, one can conceive of men and women voluntarily coming to work not in the sense that they are free to choose wage labor but in the specific sense that they derive intrinsic satisfaction from the sociability of labor, from the activity itself, from the skill they manage to acquire, and from the pride they take in their work. Marxist theories of labor discipline consistently ignore these aspects of submission to the wage bargain and consequently overstate the centrality of penal force in reproducing those relations. The fact that workers do submit to the wage bargain need not imply that they accept the terms of their subordination as legitimate; it is a cliche of labor history that those whose wage levels, skill, and pride in craftsmanship gave them the most reasons for satisfaction with industrial labor were often the most militant in their political and moral challenge to it as a system. The point is simply that the punitive sanction of the state need not be regarded as decisive in the reproduction of exploitative and unequal social relations.
Going still further, it could be asked whether force itself, apart from its specific embodiment in state apparatuses of coercion, is decisive to the maintenance of social order. The tacit social theory of Foucault's Discipline and Punish describes all social relations in the language of power, domination, and subordination. This would imply that individuals are naturally unsocial or asocial, requiring discipline and domination before they will submit to social rules. Not surprisingly, therefore, How then are we to think through a theory of the reproduction of social life which would give relative weights to the compelled and the consensual, the bound and the free, the chosen and the determined dimensions of human action in given historical societies? Contemporary social theory is increasingly aware that it has been ill-served by the grand theoretical tradition in its approach to these questions-a Parsonian functionalism which restricts human action to the discharge of prescribed roles and the internalization of values; a Marxism which in its hostility to the idealist account of human subjectivity went a long way toward making the active human subject the determined object of ideological system and social formation; and a structuralism which likewise seems to make individual intellectual creativity and moral choice the determined result of cultural and discursive structure (Giddens 1976 ). Work-a-day historians and sociologists of criminal justice may well ask at this point what this high-flown theoretical debate has to do with them, or what they could possibly contribute to it. Its relevance is that any theory or history of punishment must make some ultimate judgment about what weight to attach to the state's penal sanction in the reproduction of obedient behavior. What weight you give depends ultimately on how much importance you attach to the consensual and voluntary aspects of human behavior. The social control theory of the 1920s, as Rothman points out in an excellent review of that literature, placed so much stress on the consensual that it neglected the coercive; the social control literature of the seventies exaggerated the coercive at the expense of the consensual (Rothman 1980b ). The first step back to a balance between these perspectives will require us to ask how crucial the state has been historically in the reproduction of the order of civil society. My suspicion is that the new social history of law and punishment in the seventies exaggerated the centrality of the state, the police, the prison, the workhouse, and the asylum.
If we are going to get beyond our present almost exclusive focus on the state as the constitutive element of order, we will have to begin to reconstitute the whole complex of informal rituals and processes within civil society for the adjudication of grievances, the settling of disputes, and the compensation of injury. Historians have only just begun to study dispute and grievance procedures within civil society in the same way as these are studied in the anthropology of law (Diamond 1974; Roberts 1980 ). Among such studies are Edward Thompson's discussion of the "rough justice" rituals of sixteenth-and seventeenth-century English villages, by means of which wifebeaters, scolds, and couples who married out of their age cohort were subjected to public scorn and humiliation by their neigh-bors (see also Davis 1975; Thompson 1972; Thomas 1971) . Because studies. of such grievance procedures exist only for the early modern period, it would be easy to conclude that the state expropriated such functions in its courts and prisons in the course of consolidating its monopoly over the means of legitimate violence (Weber 1947 , pp. 324-37) .
But the idea that the state enjoys a monopoly over legitimate means of violence is long overdue for challenge. The crimes which it visits with punishment ought to be interpreted as the tip of an iceberg, as a small part of those disputes, conflicts, thefts, assaults too damaging, too threatening, too morally outrageous to be handled within the family, the work unit, the neighborhood, the street. It would be wrong, I think, to conclude that early modern English villages were the only communities capable of exercising these de facto judicial powers. Until recently, social histories of the working-class family and the working-class neighborhood were too confined within their subdisciplines to include discussion of the anthropology of dispute settlement and the social history of relations with the police, the courts, and the prisons. But what is now opening up as an area of study is the social process by which crime was identified within these units of civil society, and how decisions were taken to channel certain acts or disputes for adjudication or punishment by the state. The correlative process, from the state side, is how agents like the police worked out a tacit agreement with the local enforcers of norms, determining which offenses were theirs to control, and which were to be left to the family, the employer, or the neighborhood (Fine et al. 1979 , pp. 118-37). Such research would indicate, I think, that powers of moral and punitive enforcement are distributed throughout civil society, and that the function of prison can only be understood once its position within a whole invisible framework of sanctioning and dispute regulation procedure in civil society has been determined. We have always known that prisons and the courts handled only a tiny fraction of delinquency known to the police. Now we must begin, if we can, to uncover the network which handled the "dark figure," which recovered stolen goods, visited retribution on known villains, demarcated the respectable, hid the innocent, and delivered up the guilty. This new area of research will not open up by itself.
Empirical fields of this sort become visible only if theory guides historians to new questions. This essay amounts to a plea to historians, criminologists, and sociologists to involve themselves seriously with texts they have been apt to dismiss as abstract and ahistorical-the classical social theory tradition of Smith, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. The involvement ought to take the form of self-criticism, for if I have argued correctly, these texts are the hidden source of some basic misconceptions-that the state enjoys a monopoly of the punitive sanction, that its moral authority and practical power are the binding sources of social order, and that all social relations can be described in the language of power and domination. If we could at least subject these ideas to practical empirical examination, a new social history of order, authority, law, and punishment would begin to emerge.
